We welcome the opportunity to respond to Merckelbach, Lynn and Lilienfeld (2016)'s commentary concerning our study (1) . Results of our study support the Trauma Model of dissociative identity disorder (DID), but Merckelbach, Lynn & Lilienfeld (2016) raised some concerns, which we will address point-bypoint.
Despite specific recognition of our modest sample sizes being a limitation, Merckelbach et al. twice criticize our sample sizes. Interestingly, in the only study they cite in which DID patients were included (2) as evidence of the Fantasy Model, which they prefer to call the socio-cognitive model (SCM), they relied on an even smaller sample (N = 12 versus our N = 17 DID patients). In addition, a major concern with their study is that DID patients were not assessed by a clinical expert but only by an experimental psychologist, increasing the risk of including false positive DID cases (factitious or imitated DID) (3) . As a matter of fact, in our study we went to great lengths to prevent inclusion of imitated DID by using two clinical experts to do the SCID-D a assessments; they verified the other's diagnoses to determine exclusion. cases were excluded from the current study. Based on our experience that one in five patients presenting with DID is a false positive, the study cited by Merckelbach et al. Model. They suggest that our results could be strengthened by informing the reader about how instructions were given to the DID patients, to exclude any possibility that we influenced them to be less suggestible and less prone to creating false memories. This is indeed an important consideration, but one already accounted for in the design of the study. Our instructions to the DID and other groups did not indicate the nature of the current study. The participants were informed that the goal of the functional magnetic resonance imaging study was to assess the processing of autobiographical memory in the human brain, which was the main component of the study (paper in preparation). We informed them that as part of this study we would ask them to complete a number of interviews and questionnaires, but not which ones or why. We carefully adhered to the various questionnaire-specific instructions at all times, including with the GSS and the DRM (more detail in the Supplementary Materials).
In who exceed a SIMS cut-off score of ≥16 were excluded to remove participants who may have been malingering (17). Kruskal-Walis H tests on the remaining subset of participants revealed significant group differences for all dissociation measures but not for anxiety (see Supplemental Material, Table 2 ). Post-hoc tests showed that both DID and PTSD groups show high levels of dissociation and similarly high levels of trauma exposure, thereby supporting the Trauma Model. Furthermore, there were significant group differences on the SIMS-total as well as the SIMS-psychosis subscale, but not on the SIMS subscales for neurological, amnesia or affective symptoms, nor on the SIMS-low intelligence, nor on fantasy proneness or either ISES subscale. Post-hoc tests on group differences in the SIMS-total revealed that DID-G participants scored significantly higher than DID-S, PTSD, and healthy control groups. On the SIMS-total and SIMS psychosis subscale, PTSD participants scored significantly higher than healthy control participants. These results generally support the Trauma Model.
In the second line of additional analyses, we performed a MANCOVA covarying the SIMS total score to assess whether results replicated when controlling for potential malingering. The new results indicate the DID patients had higher dissociation and trauma exposure as well greater attachment insecurity with mothers and fathers, even when supposed malingering is controlled (see Supplemental Materials, Table 3 ). Again, these findings support the Trauma Model. A MANCOVA controlling for SIMS scores demonstrated significant group differences on the ISES general subscale, and the neurologic, low intelligence, and psychosis subscales of the SIMS. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the DID-G group, as compared to the other groups, scored significantly higher on the DES, SDQ-20, PBI a -paternal overprotection, and all measures of the CDS and TEC (and significantly lower on paternal care compared to all other groups, and significantly lower on maternal care compared to DID-S and HC participants); the DID-G participants scored significantly higher on the SIMS-neurologic subscale and significantly lower on SIMS-psychosis subscale compared to PTSD participants; the DID-G group scored significantly higher than healthy control participants on sleep problems (ISES-general subscale) and SIMS-low intelligence subscale; and the DID-G group scored significantly higher on the SIMS-low intelligence subscale than the DID-S group. The neurologic subscale of the SIMS is likely associated with trauma exposure and given that endorsement of the items on this scale could be due to trauma exposure (e.g., psychoform experiences such as one's senses, muscle tone, or balance being variable), we expected that the most highly traumatized group, that is the DID-G group, would score higher on this scale than the PTSD group. In
